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Abstract
The actual/virtual distinction is used to give an alternative account of quantum interference by way 
of a new theory of probability. The new theory is obtained by changing one of the axioms of the 
canonical theory of probability while keeping the other axioms fixed. It is used to give an alternative 
account of constructive quantum interference in the two-slit experiment. The account crucially 
involves a distinction between actual and virtual probabilities. Although actual probabilities are 
operational and virtual probabilities are not, there is a substantial connection between them. Virtual 
probabilities may be obtained indirectly from actual probabilities. In showing this, interpretive 
considerations are brought to bear including some having to do with quantum non-locality. 
Directions for future research are discussed in closing.
Key words: quantum, interference, theory of probability, two-slit experiment, locality.
Resumen. Eventos reales y virtuales en el dominio cuántico 
La distinción actual/virtual se utiliza para dar una explicación alternativa de la interferencia cuántica 
a través de una nueva teoría de la probabilidad. La nueva teoría se ha obtenido cambiando uno de 
los axiomas de la teoría canónica de la probabilidad y manteniendo los otros axiomas fijos. Se usa 
para dar una explicación alternativa de la interferencia cuántica constructiva en el experimento de 
la doble rendija. El informe fundamentalmente implica una distinción entre las probabilidades 
actuales y virtuales. Aunque las probabilidades actuales son operativas y las probabilidades virtuales 
no, hay una relación sustancial entre ellas. Probabilidades virtuales pueden obtenerse indirectamente 
a partir de las probabilidades reales. Para demostrar esta interpretación hay que tener en cuenta las 
consideraciones de interpretación que se ejercen entre ellos y que tienen relación con la no-localidad 
cuántica. Directrices para futuras investigaciones se abordan al final del artículo.
Palabras clave: cuántica,  interferencia, probabilidad, doble rendija, localidad. 
1. I would very much like to thank the organizers of the VII International Ontology Congress in San 
Sebastián from 2-6 October 2006 for their kind invitation to participate in the congress, which was 
very stimulating in many ways,. This paper is based on my presentation at the congress. Please direct 
correspondence about it to kronz@mail.utexas.edu. 
Fred KronzOntology Studies 9, 2009 210
1. Introduction
One effective strategy for generating new frameworks that lead to important insights is 
to take an existing framework in axiomatic form and change slightly one or more of the 
axioms while keeping the others fixed. There are well-known examples in geometry and 
logic. In Euclidean geometry the parallel postulate was modified to form Lobachevskian 
geometry, and in Boolean logic the distributive law was modified to form quantum logic. 
In what follows the positivity axiom of Kolmogorov probability is modified to form non-
monotonic probability—the positivity axiom places the lower bound for probabilities at 
0 and the new theory places that bound at –1. It was inspired by interference phenomena 
in the quantum domain. It is shown in (Kronz, 2006) and (Kronz, 2007) that the new 
framework captures important aspects of quantum interference in experiments on the 
simplest of quantum systems, two-state systems (so-named because they involve measurable 
physical quantities that have just two possible values such as 1 and 0, or +1 and –1).2
 Negative probabilities have been used before to capture physical phenomena. 
Muckenheim’s (1986) review of extended probabilities discusses several such contexts such 
as phase-space formulations of quantum mechanics and indefinite metric space formulations 
of quantum electrodynamics. Negative probabilities have also been used to formulate local 
hidden-variables theories for quantum mechanics (Rothman and Sudarshan, 2000) and 
to provide a non-standard account of quantum interference (Feynman, 1987). A formal 
framework for Feynman’s approach was first presented in (Kronz, 2006), which provides 
a rigorous elaboration and simplification of Feynman’s work. In (Kronz, forthcoming) the 
non-monotonic theory is generalized for n-state systems, for any counting number n. The 
discussion below highlights the role of the virtual/actual distinction in applying the theory 
via a simplified version of the two-slit experiment.
2. Probability theory
Suppose that E is a given experiment having two possible outcomes.3 A simple example to 
bear in mind is a coin flip that is repeated many times, the two possible outcomes being 
heads and tails. One way to think about probability is in terms of what happens when E 
is repeated many times (under the assumption that the outcome of one experiment does 
not affect another). The probability of an outcome (say heads) is often connected with 
2. In the works cited above, the two-state systems involve the observables spin-1/2 and photon polari-
zation, respectively. Below, the two-slit experiment is treated as a two-state system. The observable 
involves a region d on a detecting plate; the value 1 corresponds to detection in d and 0 to detection 
outside d.
3. What follows is easily generalized to one in which there is discrete number of possible outcomes but 
the special case of two possible ocutocmes will suffice for the purposes here.
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the long run relative frequency of occurrence of the outcome. If E is repeated n times and 
the outcome of interest occurs k times, then the relative frequency of occurrence of the 
outcome is k/n. The term long run is meant to convey that the number of trials n must be 
suitably large before the relative frequency of occurrence may be regarded as the probability 
for the outcome.
 A coin-flip experiment can be used to give a brief explanation of why the meaning 
of long run is a subtle matter. Take an unbiased coin, one that it is symmetrical and well 
balanced so that the probability of heads is ½, and consider what can happen in the short 
run, where the number of experiments is relatively small. In that case, the probability value 
for a given outcome does not impose restrictions on what happens. In ten flips of a fair 
coin, the outcome need not be heads in five of them. There are many sequences of ten flips 
in which the number of heads is other than five:  one in which all outcomes are heads, ten 
having nine heads and one tails, and so on. The term “maverick” may be used to describe 
such sequences, meaning those in which the relative frequency of occurrence is not equal to 
the probability. As the number of experiments (the sequence length) increases, so does the 
number of mavericks. One may be inclined to think that mavericks eventually overwhelm 
non-mavericks, but the reverse is the case. The key result is Bernoulli’s theorem, a deep 
theorem in the theory of probability, which says that the frequency of non-mavericks 
eventually overwhelms that of the mavericks.4 For what follows, it is okay to suppose that 
n is large enough and set aside questions as to whether the long run is to be associated with 
some appropriately large number (that may depend on the probability value) or with the 
limit as n goes to infinity.
 The positivity axiom together with some others axioms entails that probability values 
range between 0 and 1.5 This range is reasonable when probabilities are uniformly associated 
with long-range relative frequencies of occurrence, an association that is weakened below. 
By definition, if the outcome O is obtained k times in n experiments, the relative frequency 
of O is k/n, which must be between 0 and 1 since k and n are counting numbers with k≤n. 
It is 1 if the outcome is always O, 0 if it is never O, and some proper fraction if the outcome 
is sometimes O and sometimes not. If one modifies the positivity axiom by reducing 
4.  A particularly clear discussion of Bernoulli’s theorem is Chapter 6 of (Gnedenko & Khinchin 1961), 
pp. 53-61.
5. The other axioms alluded to here are Total Probability, Conditional Probability, and Additivity. Total 
Probability says that the probability of a tautological event is one. Conditional Probability defines the 
probability of one event given a second as equal to the probability of their conjunction divided by 
the probability of the second (if the latter is not equal to zero). Additivity says that the probability of 
the disjunction of two events is equal to the sum of the probability of the disjuncts whenever the dis-
juncts are mutually exclusive. One other axiom of the standard theory is not invoked here, Countable 
Additivity, which has to do with the probability of a disjunction having a countably infinite number of 
disjuncts.
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the lower bound to –1, then the meaning of probability and related notions change.6 
For example, a broader range of possible probability values follows from the new axiom 
together with the rest; the range becomes –1 to 2 instead of 0 to 1. Relative frequencies and 
probabilities can still be associated together in the new theory, but that association must 
be suitably tempered. That is accomplished here by way of the actual/virtual distinction. 
Actual probabilities are operational, meaning that they can be directly measured as relative 
frequencies of occurrence in an actual experiment. Virtual probabilities are not operational 
in this sense. However, they can be derived from actual probabilities together with some 
interpretive identities. The character of these identities and the role that they are to play are 
explained below. It follows immediately that actual probabilities have the standard range 
for probabilities. It turns out that virtual probabilities have the extended range implied by 
the axioms of the nonstandard theory.
 3. Suggestive aspects of the two-slit experiment
The canonical example of quantum interference is the two-slit experiment. It involves a 
source, a screen with two slits, and a detecting plate. It will be informative to discuss that 
experiment as a two-state system by focusing on one region of the detecting plate where 
constructive interference occurs. 
Diagram 1. The Two-Slit Experiment
Three configurations of the experiment are relevant—see Table 1.
State Configuration
C1 c1 is open   &  c2 is open
C2 c1 is open   &  c2 is closed
C3 c1 is closed &  c2 is open
Table 1: Three configurations of the two-slit experiment.
6.  Similar changes occur in geometry and logic, respectively, when the parallel postulate and the distri-
butive law are modified. For example, the meaning of “straight line” changes when the axioms permit 
there to be at least two distinct lines through a given point that are each parallel to a given line. 
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To say that constructive interference occurs at d means that more photons are detected at 
d given C1 than the sum of what is detected at d given C2 and what is detected at d given 
C3. That is, there are more photons that hit d when both slits are open for a given length of 
time T than do so when photons are collected over 2T, over T with only c1 open and then 
again over T with only c2 open.
 For the purposes here, the situation above is now characterized in terms of probabilities. 
What follows is a preliminary characterization; it will later undergo modification due 
to subtleties that arise. Let A denote that the photon passes through c1, B that it passes 
through c2, and D that it is detected at d. The case of constructive interference above 
may now be characterized as a situation in which the probability that the photon passes 
through either one slit or the other and lands at d, P((AvB)&D), is greater than the sum 
of the probabilities for its passing through each of them, P(A&D)+P(B&D). The idea is 
that the three probabilities formally indicated (two of them in the sum) are actual; they are 
operationalized via the three configurations of the two-slit experiment indicated in Table 
1. This formal characterization is incorrect; nevertheless, it is instructive to proceed for 
the moment along this line since doing so reveals the possible utility of allowing for non-
standard probability values.
 The relevance of negative probability values becomes apparent via general additivity, 
a theorem that relates the three probability expressions above with a fourth. The theorem 
follows. 
P((A∨B)&D)=P(A&D)+P(B&D)–P((A&B)&D)
The theorem is counter-intuitive since it is not obvious why the third term on the right 
is required. The reason is that if A and B are not mutually exclusive, then the probability 
associated with A&B is counted twice, once in determining P(A&D) and again in 
determining P(B&D). 
Diagram 2. The region A&B is counted twice when A and B are added together.
Constructive interference is a situation in which P((A∨B)&D)>P(A&D)+P(B&D), as 
indicated above, which suggests that might be accounted for, if  one allows P((A&B)&R) 
to be less than zero.
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4. One subtle aspect of the two-slit experiment—the portrayal issue
Although the considerations above are both suggestive and informative, it turns out that 
they are somewhat off  track. One subtlety has to do with the probabilistic portrayal of  
the event that occurs in each of  the three configurations of  the experiment. Consider 
the configuration C1 where both slits are open. The event at the screen is portrayed 
disjunctively as (AvB), meaning that when both slits are open the photon goes through 
either one slit or the other or both. However, it could instead be portrayed conjunctively 
as (A&B), meaning that it always goes through both slits when both slits are open. Similar 
considerations apply to C2 and C3. In configuration C2 the event at the screen is portrayed 
simply as A, but it could be portrayed conjuctively as (A&¬B) to indicate the relevance of  
both its success in passing through c1 and its failure to pass through c2 in characterizing 
that event. The same goes for C3 with regards to B and (¬A&B). 
In light of the considerations above, there are four distinct portrayals of the two-slit 
experiment, depending on whether the configurations in which only one slit is open is 
characterized simply or conjunctively, and whether the configuration in which both slits are 
open is characterized disjunctively or conjunctively. The four portrayals are characterized 
in Table 2.
Table 2: Four portrayals of the events at the screen in each configuration of the two-slit 
experiment.
In the previous section Portrayal 1, the typical portrayal of the two-slit experiment, 
was used. It turns out that only Portrayal 4 will do. The other three lead to divergent 
conditional probabilities, unlike the fourth, as shown in (Kronz 2006) and (Kronz 2007) 
using analyzer-loop experiments that bear marked resemblance to the two-slit experiment 
that is under consideration—see Diagram 3.7
7. Conditional probabilities have the form P(X|Y), which means the probability of X given that Y. See 
footnote 2 above for more details.
Configuration Portrayal 1 Portrayal 2 Portrayal 3 Portrayal 4
C1 A A A&¬B A&¬B
C2 B B ¬A&B ¬A&B
C3 A∨B A&B A∨B A&B
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Diagram 3. The illustration above portrays a loop experiment for a two-state quantum 
system. There are two channels in the loop each with a moveable stop, so the experiment 
has three relevant configurations.
Those effects occur in recombined-beam experiments. Such experiments use an analyzer 
loop—two linearly arranged analyzers that are oppositely oriented.8 The set-up is very 
similar to the two-slit experiment in that there are two channels c1 and c2 that can be 
stopped, and a detection point d. The key difference is that the formula that captures the 
probability values for the three key events is much simpler in the analyzer loop experiment 
than it is in the two-slit experiment, so the key result that only the fourth portrayal will 
work due to divergent conditional probabilities in the other three is more easily shown. 
The emphasis in this presentation is more qualitative than that in the works cited above, 
and it focuses more on interpretive matters concerning the potential/actual distinction; the 
two-slit experiment is best for such discussions due to its familiarity.
5. Another subtle aspect of the two-slit experiment—the conditionalization issue
Aside from the portrayal issue (Section 4), there is another issue that was left out of the 
preliminary account of the two-slit experiment (Section 3). Conditional probabilities 
are again involved as in the portrayal issue, but in a completely different way. When the 
conditional character of the operational probabilities is made explicit, the relevance of the 
potential/actual distinction comes to the fore.
8.  One experiment of this type involves photons, in which case the key observable is photon polarization. 
The analyzers of the loop and the measuring device are calcite crystals. Calcite is bi-linearly refringent, 
meaning that it bends light into two distinct channels. In one channel the photons are polarized along 
the orientation of the crystal and in the other they are polarized in the direction orthogonal to both the 
crystal orientation and the direction of motion.
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 In presenting the preliminary account of constructive interference in the experiment, it 
was shown that if the probabilities associated with its three configurations are considered 
together via general additivity, a suggestive role for negative probabilities then emerges. 
That insight disappears, if the role of the associated configuration is made explicit using 
conditional probabilities; that is, it disappears. if one uses P((AvB)&D|C1), P(A&D|C2), 
and P(B&D|C3) instead of P((AvB)&D), P(A&D), and P(B&D), respectively. One way to 
get the insight back is by introducing virtual probabilities, P(A&D|C1) and P(B&D|C1), 
and then by identifying them (meaning their respective values) with the corresponding 
actual probabilities, P(A&D|C2) and P(B&D|C3). One then has 
P((A∨B)&D|C1)>P(A&D|C1)+P(B&D|C1).
It appears much as before that constructive interference might be accounted for by way 
of general additivity, if P(A&B&D|C1) can be less than zero. In the preliminary account, 
P(A&B&D|C1) would be another virtual probability. However, when the portrayal issue is 
addressed in the manner indicated above, it would be interpreted as an actual probability. 
Some other probability would be interpreted as virtual and take on the explanatory role 
played by P(A&B&D|C1) in the preliminary account. Also, some other virtual probabilities 
would have to be involved in the account, and they would have to be identified with the 
actual probabilities of configurations 2 and 3 of the experiment.
6. Putting the two lessons above together 
In Section 4, it was shown that each of  the three configurations of  the two-slit experiment 
should be portrayed conjunctively. For C1 the probability is P(A&B&D), for C2 it is 
P(A&¬B&D), and for C3 it is P(¬A&B&D). In Section 5, it was shown that these actual 
probabilities should be characterized conditionally with respect to the configuration, 
meaning as P(A&B&D|C1), P(A&¬B&D|C2), and P(¬A&B&D|C3), respectively. Using 
the developments in that section as a guide, the second and third should be associated with 
the virtual probabilities, P(A&¬B&D|C1) and P(¬A&B&D|C1), respectively. However, at 
this point more sophisticated considerations are need to obtain the counterpart to the key 
insight of  the preliminary account.
 First, one notices that general additivity cannot as before be used to generate the key 
insight. The form ascribed to the actual (operational) probabilities of  the preliminary 
account suggested the relevance of  that axiom since it relates those probabilities together. 
In the informed account, the form ascribed to the operational probabilities may be related 
by a theorem of  the canonical theory (as well as of  the new theory). A simple version of  
that theorem is the following:
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P(A∨B)=  P(A&B)+P(A&¬B)+P(¬A&B).
The key to deriving it is that (A∨B) is logically equivalent to ((A&B)∨(A&¬B)∨(∨A&B)). 
The relevant theorem has the following form:
P((A∨B)&D|C1)=P(A&B&D|C1)+P(A&¬B&D|C1)+P(¬A&B&D|C1).
The difficulty is that the above theorem does not formally manifest a role for negative 
probabilities, unlike general additivity. The route to that conclusion is less direct. To get 
there, it is necessary to use quantitative values, and it is relatively simple to obtain revealing 
values in loop experiments, the simplest being loop experiments for two-state quantum 
systems—see Diagram 3.
 There are configurations of  such experiments that yield revealing sets of  values, such 
as those where P(A&B&D|C1)=1 and P(A&¬B&D|C1)+P(¬A&B&D|C1)=½. Given 
these values and the above theorem, it follows that P((A∨B)&D|C1)>1, the upshot being 
that one can account for constructive quantum interference, if  probability values greater 
than one are allowed. It turns out that this is effectively the same as the lesson drawn in the 
preliminary account, since hyper-unitary values and negative values go hand in hand in the 
new theory; the canonical theory’s negation theorem, which says that P(¬A)=1–P(A) for 
any sentence A, is also a theorem of  the new theory. Finally, it turns out that the maximal 
value of  P((A∨B)&D|C1) is 2 over all possible loop-experiment configurations for two-
state quantum systems, which entails (together with the negation theorem) that the range 
of  probability values (for two state systems) is between –1 and 2.
7. Concluding remarks — some interpretive, formal, and practical considerations
Constructive quantum interference is very peculiar feature of quantum mechanics that 
deserves special interpretive consideration to provide a richer and fuller understanding of its 
character. Its peculiar character is understood by reference to what happens in the other two 
configurations where one of the paths is blocked. What happens in those configurations is 
relevant to what happens in the interference configuration, since the former is used to show 
why the latter is unexpected or peculiar. However, they must be understood differently 
when they are transported to that context since they are not operational in that context. 
The proposal here is that they are virtual probabilities having values that correspond to the 
actual ones.
 Since the focus now is on the configuration in which both paths are open, the conjoined 
term D, reference to the associated configuration, and the interpretive move identifying a 
virtual probability value with the associated actual probability value may be suppressed for 
the sake of  simplicity. The three measurement events of  special interest for understanding 
constructive quantum interference may be characterized as (A&B), (A&¬B), and (¬A&B). 
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A fourth may be included that corresponds to (¬A&¬B), meaning the trivial experiment 
in which both passages are closed, in which case the probability for detection at d is zero. 
Probability values may be associated with all four, which are interpreted as virtual (in 
the configuration under discussion) with the exception of  that corresponding to (A&B), 
which is interpreted as actual.
 It turns out that a complete system of  virtual probabilities involving only A and B 
(and D) can be generated from these four that includes all disjunctive, complementary, 
conditional, and marginal probabilities. Values can be obtained for all of  them once one 
has probability values for the actual event (A&B) and the three virtual events (A&¬B), 
(¬A&B), and (¬A&¬B). It is difficult to say what those probabilities mean, nevertheless 
they must be regarded as meaningful since extent P(A&¬B&D|C1) and P(¬A&B&D|C1) 
are so regarded. That they are systematized via the non-standard theory of  probability 
characterized above must also be regarded as significant.
 For interpretive matters, there is a formal feature that each of  four operational events 
(now including the trivial one) have in common that may be pertinent to the interpretation 
of  virtual probabilities, namely that each of  them is conjunctive. This suggests that the 
key operational events must be understood as being essentially and irreducibly non-
local. Moreover, local events such as a photon’s passing through c1 can only be ascribed 
probabilities derivatively in terms of  operational probabilities ascribed to the essentially 
non-local events, and these derivative probabilities are virtual and they are characterized by 
the axioms of  the new probability theory.
 Although non-local events are more fundamental from an epistemic (or operational) 
point of  view, they need not be so regarded from an ontic point of  view. Indeed, one may 
be inclined to regard local (but virtual) events as being more fundamental, ontologically 
speaking. In that case, interpretive considerations would move in the reverse direction. 
That is to say, virtual events that obey a non-standard theory of  probability would be 
regarded as giving rise to operational events that obey the axioms of  the standard theory. 
Such speculations are a bit premature, since it is important to determine the nature of  
virtual events in the generalized case (meaning for n-state systems, for any counting 
number n) and for compound systems consisting of  two or more components. Some 
progress has been made in the generalized case, and it turns out that the non-standard 
probability theory must be suitably modified so that the range of  probabilities becomes a 
function of  n (Kronz, forthcoming).  One interesting development that has been obtained 
for compound systems is that conditional probabilities do not stay within the standard 
range, as they do for single systems (Kronz, unpublished manuscript).9 
 Are there any reasons for thinking that the new theory of  probability could have 
applicability beyond the quantum domain? Indeed, there are since there are already 
9. For inquiries about this manuscript, please contact the author via email at kronz@mail.utexas.edu.
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a number of  non-quantum situations in which negative probabilities arise. They are 
discussed in the economics, queuing theory, and psychology literatures for example. A 
very brief  sketch follows.
 In economics, some market models involve negative probabilities, and their existence 
is typically seen as opening the door to arbitrage (risk-free profits arising from an asset 
price differential in two or more markets). The typical response is the introduction of a “no 
arbitrage” requirement that is satisfied by incorporating some ad hoc device into the model 
such as the substitution (at each stage of the process) of each negative probability with zero 
or some small fraction above zero (and similarly any hyper-unitary probabilities are replaced 
with one or some small fraction below one); for example, see (Rubenstein 1994) and (Kim 
and Park 2006). Very recently, an alternative perspective has been adopted towards negative 
probabilities and arbitrage possibilities, one that is more favorably disposed towards these 
notions (Khrennikov 2007).
 In queuing theory (a part of operations research that is particularly useful for modeling 
computer systems and communications networks), there are models in which negative 
probabilities arise. Usually the strategy is to regard such probabilities as undesirable and 
eliminate them by substitution (Chandy and Sauer 1980), as in the previous case involving 
arbitrage. However, some queuing theorists have recently adopted a more favorable attitude 
(Tijms 2007).
 Finally, in psychology negative probabilities arise in subjective probability judgment 
studies. A typical strategy is to set negative probabilities to zero, and it is regarded as an 
effective way of “removing inconsistencies” having to do with the possibility of creating 
a “Dutch book” (a betting scenario where the subject always loses); for example, see 
(Clemen and Ulu, forthcoming), which has additional references. However, if probabilities 
outside the normal range can be interpreted as virtual probabilities that correspond to 
virtual events, meaning that the occurrence or non-occurrence of those events cannot be 
operationally verified, then there will be no conflict with the rational constraints that are 
typically brought to bear in justifying the axioms of the standard theory of probability—see 
(Roberts, unpublished manuscript).10 That is to say, Dutch books are effectively precluded.
The range of applicability of the notion of negative probability now clearly extends beyond 
the quantum domain. Moreover, that notion is now being regarded as a potentially 
positive feature rather than a pathological one. The considerations introduced above and 
in the related works (Kronz 2006, 2007, forthcoming) serve to show that this notion 
can be formalized, systematically applied, and meaningfully interpreted in the quantum 
domain. There is substantial room for development on all of these fronts. Nevertheless, 
those considerations also hold promise for similar developments in the broader range of 
applicability.
10. For inquiries about this manuscript, please contact John Roberts via email at jtrosap@email.unc.edu.
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